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Abstract: The experience of pain in disorders of consciousness is still debated. Neuroimaging
studies, using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Positron Emission Tomography (PET),
multichannel electroencephalography (EEG) and laser-evoked potentials, suggest that the perception
of pain increases with the level of consciousness. Brain activation in response to noxious stimuli has
been observed in patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), which is also referred
to as a vegetative state (VS), as well as those in a minimally conscious state (MCS). However, all
of these techniques suggest that pain-related brain activation patterns of patients in MCS more
closely resemble those of healthy subjects. This is further supported by fMRI findings showing
a much greater functional connectivity within the structures of the so-called pain matrix in MCS
as compared to UWS/VS patients. Nonetheless, when interpreting the results, a distinction is
necessary between autonomic responses to potentially harmful stimuli and conscious experience of
the unpleasantness of pain. Even more so if we consider that the degree of residual functioning and
cortical connectivity necessary for the somatosensory, affective and cognitive-evaluative components
of pain processing are not yet clear. Although procedurally challenging, the particular value of the
aforementioned techniques in the assessment of pain in disorders of consciousness has been clearly
demonstrated. The study of pain-related brain activation and functioning can contribute to a better
understanding of the networks underlying pain perception while addressing clinical and ethical
questions concerning patient care. Further development of technology and methods should aim to
increase the availability of neuroimaging, objective assessment of functional connectivity and analysis
at the level of individual cases as well as group comparisons. This will enable neuroimaging to truly
become a clinical tool to reliably investigate pain in severely brain-injured patients as well as an asset
for research.
Keywords: consciousness; neuroimaging; pain; vegetative state; unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome; minimally conscious state
1. Disorders of Consciousness: An Overview
Disorders of consciousness (DOCs) is an umbrella term for coma, unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome or vegetative state (UWS/VS) and minimally conscious state (MCS) [1]. In the case of coma,
brainstem arousability is lost as a consequence of a lesion in the ascending reticular system or due
to diffuse hemispheric damage. The patient in a condition of a coma is therefore neither awake nor
aware [2]. In UWS/VS, brainstem arousability is preserved, but there is no sign of consciousness.
The patient is considered to be awake but not aware [3]. Finally, patients in an MCS show fluctuating
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signs of consciousness: they are awake and also show awareness to a degree that can vary both
between individuals and within the same individual over time [4]. Given the heterogeneity of their
behavioural responses, this group is now further categorised as MCS+ and MCS− [5]. The former
shows high-level behavioural responses such as command following, intelligible verbalisations or
non-functional communication, while the latter shows only low-level behavioural responses such
as visual pursuit, localisation in response to noxious stimulation or contingent behaviour such as
appropriate smiling or crying to emotional stimuli [5]. The regaining of specific purposeful behaviours,
such as the ability for functional object use and functional communication, denotes the emergence
from the MCS towards a fully conscious state. A further subgroup of patients with DOCs is one
composed of individuals that are completely unresponsive from a behavioural point of view but show
covert consciousness when investigated by means of advanced neuroimaging or electrophysiological
techniques [5,6]. There is evidence of wide dissociation of motor and cognitive function in these
patients, but, at present, there is no agreed label to properly distinguish them as a category [7]. They
were initially referred to as being in a functional locked-in state as they seem able to perform specific
mental imagery tasks (such as imagining playing tennis or moving around their home) without
the possibility of conveying mental activity through overt behaviours [5]. The term cognitive motor
dissociation was later introduced to highlight the dissociation of measured bedside behaviour and
laboratory investigations [7]. This condition, characterised by functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) or electrophysiological evidence of command-following despite the total absence of behavioural
responsiveness, usually follows a widespread brain injury and sometimes represents a phase of
recovery from UWS/VS [7–9]. Specific damage to motor thalamocortical fibres has recently been
indicated as a biomarker of cognitive motor dissociation, as motor execution, unlike motor imagery,
requires the proper working of an excitatory coupling between the thalamus and the primary motor
cortex [10]. This state must be differentiated from structural locked-in syndrome, where a specific
ventral brainstem lesion is responsible for a condition of motor entrapment due to the interruption of
corticospinal and corticobulbar motor pathways [9,11]. By definition, these patients show preserved
consciousness (after the acute phase of brain damage) and unaffected cognitive abilities, as the primary
injury does not involve the supratentorial brain regions [9,11]. However, despite this traditional view,
recent evidence shows that most patients with structural locked-in syndrome (LIS) may also experience
cognitive dysfunctions including motor imagery defects and emotional disturbances, suggesting that
these additional symptoms may contribute to the frequent confusion in diagnosis between patients
with DOCs and structural LIS [12–16]. More recent findings also suggest that chronic patients with
structural LIS react to the sudden interruption of motor pathways showing a later selective cortical
loss [16]. Finally, further confusion may arise when patients with a structural LIS show additional
remote brain lesions beyond the pontine one. This condition is more likely to occur after severe
traumatic brain injuries causing scattered brain lesions both at a supratentorial and subtentorial level.
In these cases, a neuropathological overlap between DOCs and LIS may lead to a variable combination
of functional and structural motor entrapment [1].
1.1. Consciousness: Still a Hard Problem
Although consciousness is at the centre of human experience and enables our interaction with the
world, it largely remains a mystery. The study of consciousness requires a recognition of its multi-level
nature. The height of human consciousness involves an awareness of past, present and future, of
abstract concepts and of matters which go well beyond the individual in the here and now. This level
of functioning also involves processes such as reasoning, memory and language. On the other hand,
the most basic level of consciousness, that which Damasio calls “core consciousness”, can be presumed
to be a biologically simpler phenomenon, which is a prerequisite of higher levels of consciousness [17].
Whether it is the impairment of this core consciousness which is being referred to when we talk about
UWS/VS is still questionable [17]. However, most of the recent studies investigating the presence of
preserved islands of consciousness in brain-injured patients were exclusively aimed at revealing the
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presence of a covert higher-level reflective self-awareness through the use of fMRI associated with
specific cognitive tasks [18–21]. For instance, during fMRI scanning, patients are asked to imagine
playing tennis or moving around their home or to listen to factually correct vs. factually incorrect
sentences, and their fMRI patterns are compared to those obtained from healthy subjects [18–21].
When the patterns of patients significantly resemble those of healthy subjects, the conclusion is
that behaviourally unresponsive patients are, indeed, covertly conscious but unable to convey their
preserved mental performances into perceived motor outputs, due to the aforementioned cognitive
motor dissociation [7,18–21]. To date, these studies seem to be the most promising way to reach a better
understanding of the pathophysiology of DOCs: however, one should remember that processing
a stimulus does not necessarily imply being conscious of it. In fact, as suggested by Damasio,
consciousness exists in the relationship between an organism and environmental stimuli in the feeling
of feeling continuous experience, which underlies subjectivity [17,22]. All of these elements raise
questions about what kind of consciousness should really be considered minimal [23]. In this respect,
a recent comparison between unitary (all-or-none) and non-unitary (gradual or continuous) models
of consciousness suggested that both kinds of models are compatible with the current definitions
of UWS/VS and MCS. Evidence from neuroimaging studies supports the view of a non-unitary
consciousness [23] and places patients with DOCs along a clinical continuum implying several
gradients of consciousness. However, to date, this evidence does not enable definitive conclusions
about the nature of consciousness and the mechanisms of its impairment.
In fact, the hardest problem we have to face when investigating consciousness and its disorders
lies with our poor knowledge about its neural correlates. Over the past century, observations of patients
with focal brain lesions allowed us to infer the anatomical organisation of the human brain and to
identify the distinctive neural substrates of the main human abilities such as motor function, language,
emotion, decision-making and attention. However, consciousness seems to escape this model as there
is a great variability of brain lesions, which are associated with consciousness impairment and no
linear relationship between the extent and localisation of brain damage and the ensuing disorder of
consciousness. Consciousness can be regarded as an emergent phenomenon that is not the product
of a single cortical area but the result of large-scale dynamics within widespread neural networks.
Recent neuroimaging evidence has suggested that UWS/VS should in fact be considered a global
disconnection syndrome in which higher order association cortices are functionally disconnected
from primary cortical areas [24,25]. This is in line with functional imaging data showing that focal
lesions, beyond interfering with the functioning of a single area, can also produce specific patterns of
altered functional connectivity among distant regions of the cortex [26]. This impaired connectivity,
associated with the functional isolation of parts of the brain, may be responsible for lack of recovery
of consciousness in a subgroup of brain-injured patients [27–29]. Alternative results have been
reported by other studies investigating the presence of specific patterns of brain damage in patients
with DOCs [30,31]. One of these studies revealed the presence of extensive white matter lesions
in patients with post-anoxic injury, with the largest lesions observed in the frontal and occipital
lobes, demonstrating that white matter involvement, even in alternatives sites with respect to those
traditionally considered, plays a crucial role in the impairment of consciousness following severe brain
injuries [30]. This observation overturns the traditional view about the prevailing involvement of grey
matter in post-anoxic damage, due to the higher energy demand of grey matter and its higher density
of glutamate receptors, and suggests investigating both grey and white matter in future neuroimaging
studies [30]. Other studies focused on the possible activation of high-level cortical areas in patients
with DOCs in response to specific cognitive paradigms, thus stressing the role of a neuropathological
overlap between grey and white matter lesions and their combined action in causing consciousness
impairment [20,31].
All of these elements suggest that, although far from localising consciousness in the human
brain, evidence from functional neuroimaging studies is certainly helping to disentangle the neural
substrates of consciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish UWS/VS, MCS and functional
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locked-in state. Studies looking at responses to noxious stimuli are also playing an important role in
this research as the degree of cortical engagement during noxious stimulation differs among patients
with increasing levels of consciousness [32].
1.2. Emerging Neuroimaging Evidence about Covert Consciousness
Patients with UWS/VS or in an MCS have, by definition, suffered severe brain damage leading
to a loss of consciousness and to concomitant neurological impairments. This means that each
patient’s neurological picture tends to be complex and highly individual. Along with compromised
consciousness, concomitant impairments may prevent patients from revealing their true level of
consciousness or communicating pain. These include aphasia, low or fluctuating levels of arousal,
severe spasticity or rigidity and a combination of other motor and cognitive symptoms as a result
of multiple focal lesions or diffuse brain damage. We recently suggested that in some cases
the behavioural unresponsiveness of patients is the consequence of the variable combination of
sub-syndromes involving the pyramidal and extrapyramidal tracts, brainstem pathways and cortical
areas [33]. Accurate diagnosis is notoriously challenging in patients with DOCs, with a reported
misdiagnosis rate of around 40% [34]. The high occurrence of bedside underestimation of consciousness
in these patients may be partly due to these concomitant impairments limiting the behavioural
repertoire [33]. Indeed, in a small percentage of patients behaviourally diagnosed as having UWS/VS,
neuroimaging has uncovered previously undetected functional communication, in the form of willful
brain activity in response to verbal instructions [18–21,35]. More routine use of neuroimaging
investigations may therefore help to bring to light cases of functional locked-in syndrome [9]. For these
reasons, multimodal assessment is of particular relevance for this group of patients; a combination of
bedside evaluation and functional neuroimaging techniques provides more insight into the patient’s
condition than behavioural observation alone. The gold standard assessment of patients with DOCs
should include careful and frequent clinical evaluation using the Coma Recovery Scale—Revised,
which has good reliability for distinguishing between UWS/VS and MCS and for identifying emergence
from MCS, along with neuroimaging and neurophysiological assessment [36,37].
1.3. Nociception and Pain
Central to the issue of pain in DOCs is the important distinction between nociception and pain.
Nociception is a physiological term describing the neural mechanisms of encoding and processing
an actually or potentially tissue-damaging event [38]. Pain, on the other hand, is “an unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage or described
in terms of such damage” [38]. This distinction is important because, although often integrated,
(nociceptive pain) each can occur without the other. A host of pain-related phenomena illustrate
that pain is not necessarily proportionate to the degree of tissue damage taking place. For instance,
pain can be perceived from amputated limbs or can occur without any evidence of physical damage,
as is sometimes the case with fibromyalgia, low back pain or headaches. In cases of thalamic pain,
no peripheral nociception is responsible for the suffering [39]. Conversely, there are circumstances
in which pain seems to be absent or inhibited despite severe damage to tissues that are served by
nociceptors. The subjective nature of pain has long been recognized, and there is now wide acceptance
that it can be influenced by biological, cognitive, emotional, social and behavioural factors.
1.4. Behavioural Assessment of Pain and Successful Management
Responses to noxious somatosensory stimuli in individuals with DOCs are of clinical, scientific,
therapeutic and ethical importance, first and foremost in guiding appropriate pain management and
optimizing physical comfort [32]. Conscious, responsive subjects can usually provide subjective reports
of their pain and lead decisions about its management. In the case of patients with DOCs this is not
possible, while there are many potential sources of pain due to multiple injuries, medical complications
or comorbidities [40,41]. In these conditions, pain management is very challenging. Patients have the
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right to adequate pain relief, but chronic over-medication may have toxic effects and over-sedation
could mask signs of recovery of consciousness and compromise rehabilitation [42]. In this respect,
the recent introduction of the Nociception Coma Scale—Revised has provided a useful tool to capture
signs of pain during the behavioural assessment of patients with DOCs [43,44]. This tool is based on
the observation of motor, verbal, and mimicry in response to painful stimulations. Its main limitation
is that it is a behavioral motor-dependent scale with the ensuing consequence that subtle signs of pain
in patients with extreme motor restrictions are at risk of being underestimated or misdiagnosed. Other
behavioural scales have been widely used to assess pain in non-communicative patients such as the
The Behavioral Pain Scale, the Critical Care Pain Observation Tool and the Scale of Behavior Indicators
of Pain [45–47]. However, all of these tools show relevant limitations, which prevent us from drawing
definitive conclusions when assessing nociception in this challenging group of patients.
Recently, a European survey investigated beliefs concerning the experience of pain in patients
with DOCs and found that 96% of the medical doctors and 97% of the paramedical professionals
thought that patients in an MCS can feel pain [48]. When asked whether they thought that patients
with UWS/VS could feel pain, 56% of the medical doctors and 68% of the paramedical professionals
answered affirmatively [48]. This particular survey suggested effects of profession, sex, age and religion
on such beliefs, highlighting the need for evidence-based medical guidelines for pain recognition
and management. Neuroimaging techniques certainly provide a promising tool to improve both
diagnosis and prognosis for patients with impaired consciousness and to contribute to more reliable
identification and management of pain.
2. Emerging Neuroimaging Evidence about the Experience of Pain in Behaviourally
Unresponsive Patients
The central nociceptive system in healthy subjects, known as the pain matrix, includes the
primary (S1) and secondary (S2) somatosensory cortices, the lateral thalamus, the insular cortex,
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and the parietal cortex.
Specifically, S2 and S2 cortices, the lateral thalamus, and the posterior insula belong to the lateral
neuronal network that encodes sensory-discriminative information while the anterior insula, the ACC,
and the prefrontal cortex belong to a medial network that encodes affective-cognitive information [49].
Several neuroimaging studies have investigated the processing of noxious somatosensory stimuli
in patients with DOCs and all concluded that these areas are not jointly recruited during painful
stimulations (Table 1). Laureys and colleagues performed positron emission tomography (PET)
scanning on 15 patients with UWS/VS while they underwent high-intensity electrical stimulation of
the median nerve. Changes in regional Cerebral Blood Flow (rCBF) were detected in the midbrain,
contralateral thalamus and primary somatosensory cortex in all the patients, indicating the selective
involvement of these structures during the noxious stimulation [50]. In contrast to healthy controls, no
stimulus-induced activation was observed in the secondary somatosensory cortex, bilateral insula,
caudal and rostral anterior cingulate and bilateral posterior parietal cortices. Indeed, functional
connectivity analysis showed that the primary somatosensory cortex was functionally disconnected
from the higher order associative areas which are thought to be necessary for conscious awareness,
including the secondary somatosensory cortex, premotor, posterior parietal, superior temporal, and
prefrontal cortices. The absence of a stimulation-related downstream activation beyond S1 as well as
the functional disconnection of S1 from higher-order cortices were interpreted as signs of a limited
capacity to process painful stimuli in patients with UWS/VS, showing a mere subcortical activation
associated with a non-specific arousal response to acute pain [50]. A later study using a similar protocol
found a pattern of residual cortical pain matrix involvement albeit without activation in the thalamus,
prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex, thus confirming the functional disconnection of single
components within the cortical pain-related framework [51]. A further study investigated differences
in brain activity in response to noxious stimuli among healthy controls and patients with UWS/VS or
MCS [52]. Patients with UWS/VS showed activation in the thalamus and S1 but with greatly reduced
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functional connectivity as compared to healthy subjects. Striking neuroimaging differences were found
between patients with UWS/VS and MCS although the stimulation did not elicit behavioural responses
in either of the two patient groups. MCS patients showed activation across the pain matrix similar to
that seen in healthy controls, although the pattern of activation was more lateralised and with less
spatial extent [52]. Moreover, as compared to patients in UWS/VS, patients in MCS also showed a
preserved functional connectivity between S1 and a wide network of associative areas, including the
frontoparietal areas implicated in the conscious perception of external somatosensory stimuli [52].
These findings suggest that the perception of pain increases with the level of consciousness and that
patients with MCS can experience pain to some extent even if, from a behavioural perspective, they
cannot consistently or reliably communicate whether they are in pain [42,53].
A later case series focused on the potential prognostic value of somatosensory evoked potentials
(SEPs) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during noxious stimulation [54]. The results
confirmed the relationship between SEPs and fMRI findings and supported their proposed combined
prognostic value as “a sort of neurophysiological Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score,” where surrogate
measures of the residual integrity of the pain matrix are used as an indication of the potential
for consciousness recovery [54]. In this respect, the most useful findings to disentangle the
mechanisms of pain perception in patients with UWS/VS have come from a large sample fMRI study
involving 30 patients with a diagnosis of non-traumatic UWS/VS and 15 healthy participants [55].
In this study, all of the participants were investigated through an alternating block design consisting of
a standardised series of noxious electrical stimuli to the participants’ left index fingers alternated with
a resting baseline condition. In the healthy group, the noxious stimulation significantly activated the S1
and S2, the ACC, the inferior frontal gyrus, the insula, the thalamus and the cerebellum. The activation
pattern was less homogenous in the UWS/VS group, where 50% of the patients showed a significant
activation in the sensory part of the pain matrix and/or the cerebellum, followed by a minority of
patients showing a significant activation in the affective part of the pain matrix including the ACC
and/or the anterior insula (30% of patients) or in both the sensory and the affective components (26.7%
of patients) [55]. Activation in the lower order structures was found in half of the UWS patients while
higher order structures were activated in four patients only. The results of this study are particularly
relevant as they further highlight the possibility that pain perception may be underestimated through
clinical assessment alone. Moreover, these findings focused the attention on the possible role of
the cerebellum, traditionally not considered part of the pain matrix, in the complex process of pain
perception both in healthy subjects and in patients with DOCs. However, a better understanding of the
mechanisms underlying the conscious perception of pain would benefit from additional connectivity
analyses among the involved areas. Future studies should take into account this issue in order to better
disentangle the neural correlates of pain perception and to help avoiding misdiagnoses across different
groups of patients.
Further studies have investigated the neural correlates of empathic responses in patients with
DOCs. In healthy individuals, listening to pain cries has been reported to elicit functional activation
within the pain matrix of the brain, so several studies have used this task to assess affective
consciousness in behaviourally unresponsive patients. In a recent study, brain haemodynamic
responses to pain cries, compared with neutral human vocalisations, were investigated through
fMRI in a large sample of patients with UWS/VS [56]. The final findings showed that the pain matrix
was activated by pain cries in more than half of the investigated patients. As the authors pointed
out, although this does not prove subjective experience of emotion in relation to the stimulus, far less
cognitive empathy, it does support the idea of an affective consciousness which is more fundamental
than cognitive consciousness and for which the neural prerequisites may be more enduring in the face
of severe cerebral damage [56].
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Table 1. Main neuroimaging studies investigating pain perception in patients with disorders of consciousness.
Authors, Year Number of Subjects Clinical Diagnosis Instrumental Assessment Nociceptive Stimulus Main Findings
Laureys et al., 2002 [50] 15 patients UWS/VS PET scanning
High-intensity electrical
stimulation of the
median nerve
Overall cerebral metabolism was 40% of normal values.
Pain-induced activation of midbrain, contralateral thalamus, and
contralateral primary somatosensory cortex (S1).
Functional dissociation of S1 from higher-order associative cortices.
Kassubek et al., 2003
[51]
7 patients UWS/VS PET scanning
High-intensity electrical
stimulation of the
median nerve
Widespread marked overall hypometabolism.
Pain-induced activation of contralateral primary somatosensory cortex
(S1), secondary somatosensory cortex (S2), cingulate cortex and
ipsilateral posterior insula.
Boly et al., 2008 [52] 20 patients compared to15 healthy subjects
UWS/VS (15)
MCS (5)
PET scanning
High-intensity electrical
stimulation of the
median nerve
VS patients: pain-induced activation of midbrain, contralateral
thalamus, and contralateral primary somatosensory cortex (S1).
MCS patients: pain-induced activation of contralateral thalamus,
primary somatosensory cortex (S1), secondary somatosensory cortex
(S2), inferior parietal lobule, superior temporal gyrus, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and medial anterior cingulate cortex.
Healthy subjects: pain-induced activation of ipsilateral and
contralateral thalamus, contralateral primary somatosensory cortex
(S1) and secondary somatosensory cortex (S2), ipsilateral and
contralateral inferior parietal lobule and superior temporal gyrus,
ipsilateral and contralateral striatum and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
and medial anterior and posterior cingulate cortex.
Zanatta et al., 2012 [54] 3 patients Coma
Combination of fMRI and
somatosensory-evoked
potentials
Bilateral electrical
stimulation of the
median nerve
Presence of preserved middle latency evoked potentials combined
with evidence of cortical activation at fMRI are good predictors of
consciousness recovery.
Markl et al., 2013 [55] 30 patients compared to15 healthy subjects UWS/VS fMRI
Electrical stimulation of
the left index finger
Healthy subjects: pain-induced activation of the primary
somatosensory cortex (S1) and secondary somatosensory cortex (S2),
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the inferior frontal gyrus, the
insula, the thalamus, and the cerebellum.
UWS/VS patients: pain-induced activation of the
sensory-discriminative pain network in 50% of patients and of the
affective pain network in 30% of patients.
Yu et al., 2013 [56] 44 patients UWS/VS fMRI Pain cries fromother people
Activation of the pain matrix areas in 24 patients (activation of the
sensory subsystem in 34% of patients and of the affective subsystem in
30% of patients).
Kotchoubey et al., 2013
[57]
12 patients compared to
17 healthy subjects
UWS/VS (6)
MCS (6)
fMRI and analysis of weighted
global connectivity
Pain cries from
other people
No significant differences in functional activation between the
UWS/VS and MCS groups in task-related fMRI; greater weighted
global connectivity in the MCS group compared to the
UWS/VS group.
De Tommaso, 2013 [58] 7 patients compared to11 healthy subjects
UWS/VS (3)
MCS (4)
Laser and somatosensory evoked
potentials recording; auditory
mismatch negativity
Laser and electrical
stimulation; auditory
paradigm
Presence of laser evoked potentials in all the patients with a significant
N2 and P2 latency increase.
Absence of late somatosensory potentials in all the patients with the
exception of one MCS patient, showing a significant N2 and P2
latency increase.
Presence of auditory mismatch negativity in all the patients.
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Table 1. Cont.
Authors, Year Number of Subjects Clinical Diagnosis Instrumental Assessment Nociceptive Stimulus Main Findings
Naro, 2015 [59] 10 patients compared to10 healthy subjects UWS/VS
Combination of motor evoked
potentials and laser evoked
potential to investigate
pain-motor integration
Laser stimulation
No significant differences in the resting motor threshold between
UWS/VS patients and healthy subjects; significantly compromised
pain-motor integration in UWS/VS patients as compared to healthy
subjects with some patients showing signs of partially restored
pain-motor integration.
De Salvo, 2015 [60] 23 patients UWS/VS (13)MCS (10)
Laser evoked potentials (LEP)
recording Laser stimulation
Lower LEP amplitudes and more delayed LEP latencies in patients in
UWS/VS as compared to patients in MCS.
De Tommaso, 2015 [61] 9 patients compared to11 healthy subjects
UWS/VS (5)
MCS (4)
Laser, somatosensory, auditory
and visual evoked
potentials recording
Laser stimulation
Variable degree of preservation of evoked responses in UWS/VS
patients as compared to healthy subjects, with the exception of laser
evoked potentials that were recognized in all the patients.
Naro, 2015 [62] 38 patients compared to15 healthy subjects
UWS/VS (23)
MCS (15)
Aδ-fiber laser evoked potentials
(Aδ-LEP) and C-fiber laser
Laser stimulation
Higher LEP amplitudes and less delayed LEP latencies in healthy
subjects as compared to DOC patients.
evoked potentials (C-LEP)
recording
Higher LEP latencies in patients with UWS/VS as compared to
patients with MCS, no significant differences in LEP amplitude.
Aricò, 2016 [63] 14 patients UWS/VS (8)MCS (6)
LEP recording and
24 h-polysomnography Laser stimulation
Higher LEP latencies and lower LEP amplitudes in patients with
UWS/VS as compared to patients with MCS.
More preserved sleep-wake cycles and a more structured sleep in
patients with MCS as compared to patients with UWS/VS.
Naro, 2016 [64] 33 patients UWS/VS (18)MCS (15)
Evaluation of Repetitive Laser
Stimulation-induced
gamma-band oscillation (GBO)
power and clinical assessment
through the NCS-R
Repetitive Laser
stimulation
Increase in GBO power and NCS-R score in all the MCS patients.
No significant increase in GBO power and NCS-R score in the
UWS/VS group with the exception of five patients.
UWS: unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; VS: vegetative state; MCS: minimally conscious state; PET: Positron Emission Tomography; fMRI: functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging;
LEP: Laser Evoked Potentials.
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A similar experimental paradigm was used by a further study to improve accuracy in
differentiating patients in UWS/VS and MCS [57]. On exposure to sounds of human pain and suffering,
no significant differences were shown between UWS/VS and MCS groups through task-related fMRI.
However, in contrast with this finding, the weighted global connectivity was significantly greater
in the MCS group compared to the UWS/VS group. Specifically, extensive functionally connected
networks were seen in MCS patients, somewhat similar to those in healthy controls, in contrast
with very limited and localised connectivity in the UWS/VS group. Thus, the authors proposed
the analysis of the brain’s global functional connectivity as a potentially useful tool for reliably
differentiating between UWS/VS and MCS [57]. Finally, other studies investigated pain perception
in patients with DOCs by implementing specific neurophysiological approaches mainly based on
the use of laser-evoked potentials [58–65]. The most comprehensive results came from a study
investigating the presence of both the Aδ-fiber and the C-fiber laser evoked potentials as a marker of a
residual cortical pain processing [62]. This study confirmed the presence of the previously mentioned
difference between patients in UWS/VS and MCS, as the former showed increased latencies and
reduced amplitudes of both the Aδ-LEP and C-laser evoked potential components as compared to the
latter. Moreover, some patients in UWS/VS were reported to have only the C-laser evoked potential
components, thus suggesting that the cortical generators of these components are more likely to
survive a severe brain injury and may represent a useful tool for instrumental pain assessment in the
most damaged patients [62]. All together, these findings pave the way for the identification of potential
neurophysiological markers of conscious pain perception in behaviourally unresponsive patients and
contribute to a better differential diagnosis between UWS/VS and MCS. It follows that a combination
of clinical, neuroimaging and neurophysiological markers may represent the best way to disentangle
the issue of pain perception and processing in patients with DOCs.
2.1. Neuroimaging Evidence to Optimise Treatments and Rehabilitation
Ultimately, a more comprehensive knowledge about brain functioning can help to personalise
rehabilitation by recognising the patient’s strengths and limitations. This may include identifying
possibilities for therapies using neuromodulation, with neuroimaging being used also in the
monitoring of changes in time within the same patient and evaluating the effectiveness of treatment
strategies [25,66,67]. Some therapeutic approaches have in fact been reported to speed the recovery of
consciousness in subgroups of patients in UWS/VS or MCS [68–76]. These approaches include the use
of pharmacological agents, such as zolpidem, levodopa, dopamine agonists and intrathecal baclofen
as well as non-pharmacological therapies including deep brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic
stimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation and spinal cord stimulation [68–76]. Within this
framework, neuroimaging techniques could help to better identify which brain pathways are viable
and non-viable in patients who are behaviourally unresponsive, enabling the planning of tailored
therapeutic approaches to increase the chances of functional recovery. In reality, neuroimaging cannot
yet be routinely used in such a way in clinical practice due to cost, availability, procedural complexity
and the need to further optimise and validate these techniques as an evidence-based tool. In time,
however, it may play an important role in profiling behaviourally unresponsive patients on the basis
of their concomitant neurological impairments and comorbidities [33]. If targeted interventions for
patients can encourage the recovery of even minimal purposeful behaviours, these patients may be
enabled to communicate their needs and any sources of discomfort or pain.
2.2. Interpreting the Findings and Looking to the Future
A degree of caution is, of course, required in the interpretation of neuroimaging findings [77]. Both
pain and consciousness are internal, subjective phenomena and neuroimaging, however sophisticated,
cannot reveal the qualitative nature of a first-person experience. It can only provide us with quantitative
surrogate measures. There is also an inherent imbalance in the conclusions that can be drawn from such
research, since consciousness can be satisfactorily demonstrated empirically while its absence cannot
Brain Sci. 2016, 6, 47 10 of 15
be irrefutably proven and the same can be said about pain [78]. Moreover, there may be a difference
between what occurs in the experimental setting and the physiological or pathological features of a real
pain experience. In fact, experiments using nociceptive stimuli in patients with DOCs have to satisfy
specific ethical principles that prevent patients being exposed to sources of significant discomfort. This
introduces a potential bias in this field of research, as the intensity of the experimental stimuli is usually
not comparable to that of real pain experienced by patients in pathological conditions (for instance
when an acute pulpitis or a renal colic occurs). This fact is a serious limitation for the interpretation of
all negative findings. Moreover, the processing of a time-limited and specific experimental stimulus,
such as an isolated electrical stimulation, only partly resembles the processing of naturally occurring
internal sources of pain, which could include mechanisms of sensitisation leading to the development
of chronic pain [42]. In this respect, there is the possibility that, in patients with DOCs, pain can become
a disorder in itself, persisting even when the original triggering pathology has been eradicated [39].
This could result through the development of chronic and centralised pain, favoured by maladaptive
neural processes during the long clinical course of the disease [39].
When interpreting findings about the degree of both consciousness and pain perception in
behaviourally unresponsive patients, it should be taken into account that diagnostic processes may
vary between centres, and it is important that clinical descriptions and diagnostic criteria used are
reported [79]. Researchers can select patients from the extreme ends of scores on responsiveness,
highlighting clear group differences between UWS/VS and MCS. Those patients around the borderline
between the two, or in an incremental transition, may be under-represented. This may contribute
to somewhat invalidate the conclusions of the studies or to limit the results to confined subgroups
of patients as a result of their wide heterogeneity and of the within-subject variability across time.
To avoid misinterpretations and misdiagnoses, a combination of behavioural, neuroimaging and
neurophysiological assessment is strongly encouraged. Moreover, behavioural observation has the
advantage that the relatives of the patient can participate in an ongoing way, alerting clinicians to
perceived behavioural changes in the patient, which may not have been present at the moment of
formal clinical assessment. This applies to pain behaviours but also to responsiveness in general.
However, if the ultimate aim is for neuroimaging to be incorporated widely as a tool for optimising
individual care plans, more focus is required on single-subject studies, including longitudinal studies
to map functioning and track changes in individual brains over time [25,57]. In fact, it has been
highlighted that a severely damaged brain will not necessarily be comparable to a healthy brain [25]
or to other injured brains in terms of structural functioning, which will vary depending on the type
and location of injury sustained [80]. The development of techniques appropriate to patients with
DOCs and single-subject studies is a challenge being addressed through both scanning protocols
and methods of analysis [25,52,57]. On the other hand, large sample studies are also necessary to
allow comparisons among different groups of patients. In fact, the findings of group analyses in the
mentioned studies confirm the wide heterogeneity of patients with respect to the pathophysiology,
extent and localisation of the underlying brain damage and the time elapsed from the primary injury.
For instance, a trend to more frequent activations of the pain matrix in (sub)acute UWS/VS patients as
compared with chronic UWS/VS patients has been observed [55]. The activation of isolated islands
of the pain matrix in chronic patients is associated with signs of general cortical atrophy of various
degrees with widening of the inner and outer cerebrospinal fluid spaces [51]. Opposite findings
have been reported in studies investigating residual affective consciousness and showing equally
distributed brain activation patterns among patients with a different disease duration [56]. Moreover,
given the high number of comorbidities previously described in these patients, it would be useful to
correlate pain-induced activation patterns with the comorbidity profile of individuals patients, in order
to better clarify how the number and the severity of long standing comorbidities may influence the
development of central sensitisation mechanisms leading to pain hypersensitivity. This would help
to determine whether normal inputs, including those that usually evoke innocuous sensations, may
represent sources of discomfort in patients with DOCs [81]. If the presence of sensitisation phenomena
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were confirmed, it should be expected that some patients with DOCs could experience a condition of
continuous pain. This would invalidate the findings of those studies using a research protocol based
on the alternation between pain stimuli and rest conditions.
3. Conclusions
Neuroimaging is contributing to our understanding of the substrates of consciousness and pain
perception in patients with DOCs. Findings suggesting partial brain activation within the pain matrix
even in patients with persistent UWS/VS caution against facile assumptions about the nonsentient
state of behaviourally unresponsive patients. On the other hand, such evidence does not allow us to
conclude that the perception of pain in these patients resembles the constellation of pain experiences
of healthy subjects. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that pathological and chronic pain mechanisms
may develop along the prolonged clinical course of the disease due to the engagement of pathological
neuroimmune pathways [82]. In MCS patients, the combination of significant levels of localised brain
activation and a pattern of functional connectivity similar to healthy controls, albeit less extensive,
point to the likelihood of a more functional pain perception. The activation of the anterior cingulate
cortex in some patients implies that this might include an affective component.
What cannot be concluded from the evidence is that any individual patient with a DOC does not
have any sentient experience of pain. Given the remaining uncertainty about this issue, a “just in case”
approach to analgesics is advocated on ethical grounds [80], with medication provided in line with the
nature of injuries, the patient’s pain history and the medical interventions necessary. It is pointed out
that cautionary analgesia according to the patient’s physical condition may also protect against harm
from the chronic effects of hormonal and immune reactions to nociception with or without perceived
pain. Future clinical and neuroimaging studies are necessary to improve our knowledge about the
intriguing relationship between consciousness and pain perception both in healthy subjects and in
severely brain-injured patients. Given the practical and emotional importance of this issue to those
involved, the scientific community has an obligation to develop the best possible means of assessing
pain perception and to periodically review the evidence.
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